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1. Introduction
One of the major obstacles governments face in their efforts to reach eq-
uity goals through income taxation is represented by the various forms of tax
dodging. This concern is particularly serious when the opportunities for tax
evasion or avoidance are not uniformly distributed among taxpayers, for tax
dodging is then likely to bring about both vertical and horizontal inequities
in the distribution of the tax burden. The empirical evidence shows indeed
that there are some «hard to tax» groups, such as self-employed workers,
professionals, small business, for which tax dodging is a relatively lucrative
and riskless activity. On the other hand, there are taxpayers, such as employ-
ees of large corporations, pensioners, and civil servants, that are entirely una-
ble to escape their tax obligations.
To face this problem, policy makers may try to improve the efficiency of the
tax collection system. This goal can be achieved by increasing the penalties for
tax evasion and/or the frequency and the quality of tax audits, or by reforming
the tax code so as to reduce the opportunities of exploiting the so called «tax
loopholes». Of course, any potential gain so obtained in terms of a more equita-
ble distribution of tax burdens must be confronted with the increased costs in
tax administration. In some cases, moreover, these traditional «weapons» are al-
most entirely ineffective in controlling tax evasion or avoidance. In fact, there are
circumstances in which tax dodging is impossible to detect, monitor and verify.
For instance, a sale «under the counter» for cash does not leave any direct evi-
dence in the accounting books; at most, indirect evidence can be obtained if the
taxpayer is unable to make «under the counter» purchases of inputs.
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The awareness of these problems has lead some governments to rely on
various forms of presumptive taxes 1 in which tax liabilities are computed us-
ing indirect methods for assessing the effective tax bases. For example, pre-
sumptive taxes are employed, or have been employed, in developed countries
like France, Israel, Italy and the Netherlands, in Latin America (Argentina,
Chile and Colombia), in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (Albania, Hungary, Macedonia and Poland, among others) – see Tanzi
and Casanegra (1989), Taube and Tadesse (1996), Harrison (1997), Cnossen
and Bovenberg (2001). Often, they are used in the agricultural sector and
more generally in all the situations in which income is difficult to ascertain
(e.g. small individual firms). The basic idea is to estimate the effective tax base
using a set of variables that (i) are highly correlated with the effective tax base,
(ii) tax authorities can monitor at low cost and (iii) cannot be easily «manipu-
lated» by the taxpayers; some instances are labour costs, telephone and elec-
tricity bills, the number of employees, the size of the store, and so on.
If it were clear that presumptive taxes could significantly increase the
government’s capability to collect taxes in an equitable way and to perform
some redistribution through the tax system, then they would represent an in-
teresting option for all those countries which are plagued by large-scale eva-
sion and avoidance of taxation. These would include some European coun-
tries like Italy, Belgium, Spain, Portugal or Greece, and the vast majority of
the developing and of the Eastern European countries;2 in particular, most
developing and transition countries lack the expertise to properly adminis-
trate a conventional income tax and are therefore prone to the insurgence of
large loopholes in the tax code.
Of course, it is not at all obvious that presumptive taxes can really help the
governments in reaching their equity aims. This paper tries to investigate the
effectiveness of taxation of presumptive income as a redistributive device 3, as-
1 The distinction between effective and presumptive taxes is not always neat, since «(t)he
conceptually pure tax base – be it the flow of income, wealth, sales revenue, or something else
– cannot be perfectly measured, and the tax authority is constrained to rely on some correlate
of the concept» (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, p. 1457).
2 For a wide set of empirical estimates of the size of the shadow economy in developing,
transition, and OECD countries, see Schneider and Enste (2000; 2002).
3 To the best of our knowledge, there are only three theoretical contributions on pre-
sumptive taxation, namely Bennet (1987), Sadka and Tanzi (1993) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki
(1994); however, they focus on different aspects of the problem than those addressed in this
paper. On the other hand, there are some theoretical works on optimal taxation that, while
not dealing explicitly with presumptive taxation, could be usefully applied to analyse this is-
sue. For instance, Stern’s (1982) lump-sum taxation with systematic measurement errors can
be viewed as a form of presumptive taxation.
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suming that a conventional income tax is in place and assessing the desirability
of introducing presumptive taxes by means of small balanced-budget reforms.
We set up an occupational choice model in which two kinds of taxpayers ex-
ist: entrepreneurs, who are able to engage in costly avoidance 4 of the income
tax, and workers (employees), who are not 5.
In the simple version of our model, in which firms are of equal size, we
get a sharp and counter-intuitive result: a presumptive tax complementing
income taxation takes the form of a lump sum subsidy to entrepreneurs. The
intuition is that a subsidy, by raising the wage rate, reduces entrepreneurs’
gross income, and this in turn reduces tax avoidance costs. The efficiency
gain so obtained, distributed to everybody through the lump sum component
of the income tax, shows up as a Pareto improvement. In the extended mod-
el, in which firms are of different size, two forms of presumptive taxes can
be used: a lump sum tax on entrepreneurs (a tax on occupational choice)
and a proportional tax on input costs (that are positively correlated with in-
come). In this setting, presumptive taxation is an effective redistributive de-
vice also when income taxation is absent. Occupational-choice presumptive
taxation takes the form of a lump sum subsidy to entrepreneurs, as in the
simple model. On the contrary, the optimal input-costs presumptive tax can
be either a tax or a subsidy, depending on the level of income taxation. On
the one hand, if the income tax is absent or low, it is desirable to introduce
a tax on input-costs as a redistributive device, although at the cost of an effi-
ciency loss. On the other hand, if the income tax rate is high, it is better to
subsidize input-costs so as to reap an efficiency gain, both in the form of
higher output and lower tax avoidance costs.
Of course, our results hinge on the model employed. Given the friction-
less occupational choice framework, were entrepreneurs to increase tax
dodging, an increase in the equilibrium wage would result in order to clear
the labour market, thus partially offsetting the negative impact on workers’
4 We model tax dodging in terms of tax avoidance, as opposed to tax evasion. We are
using a distinction between the two based on the economic concept of risk: avoidance is cost-
ly and riskless, while evasion is risky because taxpayers are fined if found guilty – see Cowell
(1990a, pp. 10-14) for a definition and Cowell (1990b) and Balestrino and Galmarini (2003)
for discussions of how the two concepts may be related. An alternative distinction, not used
here, is based on whether the activity is legal (avoidance) or not (evasion).
5 Of course, while most OECD and transition countries levy an income tax on workers,
most developing countries do not; our qualitative results, however, carry over to the case in
which only entrepreneurs are subject to the income tax. For simplicity, we use a one-good
model, and therefore we do not consider indirect taxation explicitly; as long as indirect taxes
can be avoided too, we expect however that the general thrust of our arguments would re-
main the same.
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welfare of increased tax avoidance. For the same reason, a presumptive sub-
sidy on entrepreneurs, by raising workers’ wage and reducing wasteful tax
avoidance costs, performs better in some circumstances than a presumptive
tax. Clearly, with less than perfect markets, our results may take a different
direction. Other restrictive features of our framework that could be ad-
dressed in future research are the assumption of exogenous labour supply
and entrepreneurial effort, the assumption of an exogenous tax enforcement
policy, and the assumption of Leontief technology.
The paper is outlined as follows. In section 2 we illustrate a simplified
version of the model which allows us to make the case for presumptive taxa-
tion in a very sharp way. In section 3 we present the full model and discuss
the desirability of presumptive taxation in greater detail. Section 4 offers
some concluding remarks.
2. Presumptive taxation in a simple occupational choice model 6
Consider a large population of individuals whose size is normalized to
unity. Each individual is identified by a parameter n, which we can think of
as representing entrepreneurial skill; we take n to be a continuous variable
uniformly distributed 7 over the [0,1] interval. Importantly, n is private infor-
mation. Each agent can choose among two options: to become an entrepre-
neur (e) or to become a worker (w). An individual that chooses e hires s > 0
units of labour at a wage rate w, in order to produce sn units of a consump-
tion good. The exogenous parameter s can be interpreted as representing the
«size» of the firm, perhaps depending on some exogenous endowment of
capital goods. In this section, we consider the simple case in which s takes
one value only; the extension to two s-groups is considered in section 3.
Hence, if a type-n agent becomes an entrepreneur, she activates s production
processes, each requiring one unit of labour and producing n units of out-
put. Her gross income is s(n – w), where the skill level, n, represents revenue
(the output price is normalized to unity) and w represents labour costs. An
individual that chooses w supplies one unit of labour to an entrepreneur.
There is no labour-leisure choice on the part of both entrepreneurs and
workers. Also, shifting between occupations is costless.
Within this simple model, there are two possible tax bases that the gov-
ernment can use for redistributive purposes: income and occupational choice.
6 Our framework is based on Boadway et al. (1991).
7 The assumption is for expositional convenience. The model can readily be extended to
other distributions of the parameter n.
167
As regards income, tax authorities observe workers’ wage directly, whereas
they have no direct knowledge of the skill level n, and hence of income, of
each entrepreneur. Thus, while workers are unable to avoid income taxation,
taxation of entrepreneurs’ income must rely on reported income, which may
differ from actual income 8. As a result, entrepreneurs will engage in tax
avoidance, i.e. will not report their actual income level, so as to gain a more
favourable tax treatment. Income taxation is restricted to be linear and unre-
lated to occupational choice. However, as tax authorities are assumed to ob-
serve the occupational choice (e or w) of each individual, they can, in princi-
ple, levy differentiated lump-sum taxes on workers and entrepreneurs to sup-
plement the income tax. This is a very simple form of presumptive taxation
that assesses the ability to pay on the basis of the type of occupation; hence
we label it Occupational Choice Presumptive Taxation (OC-PT) 9.
2.1. Market equilibrium
Let yi, i ∈ {w,e}, be net income (consumption) associated to option i.
The following assumption characterizes agents’ preferences.
Assumption 1. (i) If y′i > y″i, i ∈ {w,e}, then y′i y″i. (ii) If yi > yj, i, j ∈
{w,e}, i ≠ j, then yi  yj. (iii) If yw > ye, then yw  ye.
A1(i) simply says that, within each option, a higher income is preferred
to a lower one. A1(ii) says that whenever two options give a different income
then the one with the higher income is preferred. A1(iii) strikes a choice
whenever the two options give the same income: w is preferred to e (but,
nothing of substance changes if we make the opposite assumption).
To define entrepreneurs’ net income, let a ∈ [0,1] be the fraction of
avoided income. Tax avoidance costs are assumed to be linear in gross in-
come: the per-unit-of-gross-income tax-avoidance-costs, c(a), depend on the
fraction of concealed income 10. c(·)satisfies the following restrictions 11:
8 In a companion paper, Balestrino and Galmarini (2005), we treat the case in which also
workers can engage in tax avoidance.
9 Fixed lump-sum payments, or licence fees, are widely used in Central and Eastern Eu-
rope (Azerbaijan, Albania and Hungary, among others – see Harrison, 1997).
10 Linearity in gross income of tax avoidance costs means that the tax avoidance technol-
ogy exhibits constant returns to scale, see Slemrod (2001). Constant returns are also assumed
by Boadway et al. (1994).
11 Throughout the paper, subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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Assumption 2. (i) c(0) = 0; c > 0 for a > 0; (ii) ca(0) = 0, ca > 0 for a > 0,
caa > 0, ca(1) ≥ 1.
A2(i): Full reporting is costless, whereas tax avoidance is always costly.
A2(ii): The marginal cost of concealing the first unit of income is zero; then
the marginal cost is positive and increasing in the level of concealed income;
the marginal cost of concealing the last unit of income is greater than or
equal to one.
Provided that n – w ≥ 0 12, the net income of a type-n entrepreneur is
thus equal to:
 –  + [1 – t + ta – c(a)]s(n – w),
where  is the OC-PT tax levied on entrepreneurs (a subsidy when nega-
tive), t ∈ [0,1] is the marginal income tax rate and  is the lump-sum com-
ponent of the income tax (when  > 0, the tax is progressive, as the average
tax rate rises with income) 13. By A1(i), tax avoidance is chosen by maximiz-
ing net income with respect to a (entrepreneurs are price-takers on the la-
bour market). The first order condition for an interior solution is t = ca that
can be solved for the optimal a. Let   ˆ( )a t  be the optimal choice for a and let
  ˆ ( ˆ)c c a= . The following Lemma characterizes the agent’s behaviour and notes
some results which we will use later on.
Lemma 1. Under A2: (i)   ˆ( )a 0 0= ,   ˆ ( , ) ( , )a for t∈ ∈0 1 0 1 ,   ˆ( )a 1 1≤ . (ii)
  ˆ ˆa ct aa= /1 0> . (iii)   ta cˆ ˆ≥ ,   ( ˆ ˆ)1 0− − >t ta c+ .
Proof. Part (i) comes directly from A2(ii) and t = ca. Part (ii) follows
from totally differentiating t – ca = 0 and using A2(ii). Part (iii) follows be-
cause if t > 0 then 
  
[ ] ˆ ( ˆ)
ˆ
t c a ta c aa
a
− − >∫  d = 
 
0
0, since t > ca for   a a∈[ , ˆ]0 ; if
t = 0, then   ˆ ˆa c= = 0. Finally,   ( ˆ ˆ)1 0− − >t ta c+ , since (1 – t) > 0 for t < 1
and   ( ˆ ˆ)ta c− > 0 for t > 0.
12 Since we assume that losses are not subsidized at the margin, we may take it that a
type-n individual never chooses e whenever n – w < 0.
13 The OC-PT tax is not deductible from the income tax base, but, as it is immediate to
show, the alternative assumption (deductibility) would not affect the results. Note that  can
be interpreted, when positive, either as a monetary or as an in-kind transfer. While formally
equivalent within our framework, the distinction between the two types of transfers is an im-
portant one for fiscal policy. Most developing countries, for instance, use in-kind rather than
monetary transfers (Bearse et al., 2000).
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Lemma 1 says that tax avoidance is zero when income is not taxed at the
margin, and positive when taxed; 100% tax avoidance never occurs, unless
t = 1 and ca(1) = 1. The proportion of avoided income is increasing in the tax
rate. Finally, the effective marginal tax rate,   ( ˆ ˆ)t ta c+ − , is smaller than the
statutory tax rate, t.
To shorten notation, let   ˆ ˆ ˆ = +1− −t ta c . With a optimally chosen, net
income associated to e is thus   y s n w
e = +  − −ˆ ( ) . Workers cannot avoid
paying the income tax, hence their net income is yw =  + w, where  = 1 – t
(notice that, by Lemma 1,   ˆ ≥ ). There is no OC-PT on workers 14.
Occupational choices are defined by the following arbitrage equation:
[1]   y s n w w y
se w+ = +≡ − − ≡    ˆ ( )
where ns is the marginal skill. This condition establishes that the net income
of the marginal workers (the most able among them) must equal the net in-
come of the marginal entrepreneurs (the least skilled). Thus, by A1(ii) and
A1(iii), those individuals whose ability goes from 0 to ns (included) choose
w, while those whose ability goes from ns (excluded) to 1 choose e. The mar-
ket clearing equation is written:
[2] ns = s(1 – ns),
where the l.h.s. represents total labour supply, and the r.h.s. total labour de-
mand.
Eqs. [1] and [2] determine the equilibrium value of the marginal skills,
  ˜ns , and the equilibrium wage rate,   ˜w , as a function of the policy variables,
[3]
  
n˜
s
s
s =
+1
,
  
˜
ˆ ˜
ˆ
w
sn
s
s
=
+
+
− 
 
,
from which we get:
[4]   ˜ (
ˆ )w s  = +− <−1 0.
The intuition is straightforward. For a given wage rate, an increase in 
would result in an excess of labour supply as some entrepreneurs (the least
14 This restriction is without loss of generality; as can be seen from the arbitrage equa-
tion [1] an increase in a workers’ lump sum tax would be actually equivalent to a reduction of
entrepreneurs’ OC-PT.
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skilled among them) would now prefer to shift to a salaried job;   ˜w  thus low-
ers so as to clear the labour market. Notice finally that   ˜w  depends on t but
is independent of .
2.2. Occupational Choice Presumptive Taxation (OC-PT)
The income distribution in the economy described by our model is far
from equal, with workers (all earning the same income) at the bottom, and
entrepreneurs at the top. This leaves ample scope for action to an equity-ori-
ented government. Suppose then that the government has a Rawlsian objec-
tive. This is not only an important benchmark case; it also covers a basic re-
quirement of any redistributive program: as long as the government cares
about equality, it will not endorse policies such that the welfare of the work-
ers – the poorest individuals – is unchanged. Indeed, it can be shown that
our results concerning the desirability of presumptive taxation would hold
for any quasi-concave social welfare function; however, the analysis is simpler
in the Ralwsian case, especially in the full version of the model explored be-
low. Our starting point will be an economy in which the government uses
the linear income tax, with (t,) fixed at some arbitrary level 15. Using this
conventional tax, the government will generally be able to tax more heavily
those who earn a higher income, but it will also induce tax avoidance. In-
deed, we saw from Lemma 1 that the marginal tax rate effectively faced by
the entrepreneurs,   t ta c– ˆ – ˆ , is lower than the statutory tax rate, t, faced by
the workers   ( ˆ ) ≥ . The presence of tax avoidance therefore impairs the
government’s capability to redistribute income using the income tax.
The obvious response to that is to engage in some forms of tax enforce-
ment. Since however tax enforcement is costly and not always effective (see
our Introduction), the government may also wish to use presumptive taxes 16.
To investigate the usefulness of presumptive taxation as a redistributive de-
vice, we will focus on small revenue-neutral reforms; that is, we look for in-
15 We do not provide an optimal taxation analysis (see, however, fn. 16), although our
results would also hold in case the income tax were optimised. Some relevant contributions
on optimal income taxation with tax avoidance or evasion are Sandmo (1981), Pestieau and
Possen (1991), Cremer and Gahvari (1994; 1995), Schroyen (1997) and Parker (1991). Opti-
mal taxation in occupational choice models (without tax dodging) is instead studied by Boad-
way et al. (1991), Kanbur (1981), Kihlstrom and Laffont (1983) and Moresi (1998).
16 We assume that tax enforcement is exogenously given. In the context of tax avoid-
ance, see Slemrod (2001), it is usual to assume that an increase in the enforcement activity
raises the avoidance costs, thereby reducing tax dodging. To focus the analysis on presump-
tive taxes, we do not address welfare-improving revenue-neutral reforms in tax enforcement.
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finitesimal adjustments in the policy instruments such that the budget con-
straint is still satisfied but welfare has improved. It turns out to be easier to
work with the resource constraint, rather than with the budget constraint.
Assuming a given revenue requirement, R, we must have that total output
equals total disposable income, plus the total cost of avoidance, plus the rev-
enue target:
[5]
  
R sn n y n y n cs n w n R
n
n n n
s
s s s
=  d  d  d  d =w
 
 
 
 
e
 
 
 
 
− − − −∫∫ ∫ ∫˜ ˜ ˆ ( ˜ )
˜
˜ ˜ ˜0
1 1 1
,
where   ˜y
w  and   ˜y
e  denote equilibrium payoffs. Given that the government
has a Rawlsian objective, a welfare improvement is simply an increase in the
workers’ net income. Let us then consider the possibility of finding a small
reform (d,d) such that the budget is unaffected but the net income of the
workers goes up. A small change in the presumptive tax levied on entrepre-
neurs (d) is thus financed by adjusting the lump-sum component of the in-
come tax (d).
From   ˜ ˜y w
w = +  , and since   ˜wa = 0, a Rawlsian-improving reform is
characterized as follows:
[6]   d = d + d
w˜ ˜y w   > 0 .
Differentiating now the equilibrium pay-offs of the agents with respect to
 and  and using [4], one obtains:
[7]   ˜ ˜y y 
w e= = 1;   ˜ ˜ ˜y y w  
w e= = < 0.
We use these to differentiate [5]:
[8]   d = d + d + dR w n csw
s− −( ˜ ) ( ˜ ) ˆ ˜    1 .
Using [2] and applying the implicit function theorem to solve dR = 0
yields:
[9]
  
d
d
=
d =


 
R
sn c w
0
( ˜ ˆ ) ˜− .
Substituting [9] into [6], and rearranging gives:
[10]
  
d = dw
d d d =
˜ ˜ ˆ ˜
( , )
y n cw
R
s
 
 
0
.
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As long as entrepreneurs avoid taxes, i.e. as long as   ˆc > 0, this is positive
for d < 0, since   ˜w < 0 . In our model, tax avoidance only takes place if
there is a positive rate of income tax –   { } { ˆ ˆ }t a c= = =0 0⇒ . Tax reforms,
however, are feasible only for income tax rates below unity –
  { , } { ˜ ˜ }t w n
s= = =1 0 ⇒ , hence d < 0, by increasing   ˜w , would cause mar-
ginal entrepreneurs’ gross income,   ˜ ˜n ws − , to become negative. We have
thus established the following local result:
Proposition 1. A revenue-neutral OC-PT reform is always Rawlsian-im-
proving as long as t > 0 and feasible as long as t < 1; the reform consists of a
marginal reduction in the entrepreneurs’ poll tax, d < 0, and, correspondingly,
a marginal reduction in the lump-sum component of the income tax, d 17.
What is the intuition behind Proposition 1? We may distinguish between
two aspects of our result. First, we showed that OC-PT reforms are Ralw-
sian-improving whenever there is a group of taxpayers who engage in tax
avoidance. Clearly, if that were not the case, the income tax would be a per-
fectly appropriate redistributive device (since, by assumption, labour supply
and entrepreneurial effort are exogenous), and no additional instrument
would be needed. However, the fact that a group of citizens can avoid taxes,
while the other cannot, implies that the effective marginal tax rate is no
longer the same across groups; indeed, we saw that the richest segment of
the population is confronted with the lowest effective tax rate. Then, some-
thing can be gained by introducing a tax that treats in different ways groups
who have different avoidance opportunities. Second, we found that the di-
rection of the reform is somewhat counterintuitive, since it involves subsidiz-
ing those who have a larger disposable income and avoid taxes. It turns out
that choosing this direction for the tax reform reduces the amount of re-
sources wasted by the entrepreneurs trying to avoid the income tax, and
therefore generates an efficiency gain which shows up as a revenue increase.
To see why, simply note that (i) a subsidy for the entrepreneurs (d < 0) in-
creases   ˜w , hence decreases their gross income,   s n w( ˜ )− , and, crucially, tax
avoidance costs,   ˆ ( ˜ )cs n w− , and (ii) changes in  and  bear the same impact
on entrepreneurs’ and workers’ incomes by [7], an outcome arising from the
general equilibrium effects of the tax rates in the labour market.
One might wonder how robust is the result stated in Proposition 1. For
17 Strictly speaking, we cannot rule out the possibility that while  is reduced,  goes up,
as [9] might be positive. However, this seems somewhat improbable (too good to be true!);
for instance, simulations with a quadratic cost-of-avoidance function, c = 0.5a2   ( ˆ )c t= .5 20
showed that a sufficient condition for [9] to be negative, independently of the value of s, is
that t < 0.73, a range that covers all plausible values for a marginal income tax rate.
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the special case analysed in this Section, in which all firms have the same
size, it is easy to generalize our finding in two important directions. First, we
can show that the result does not only hold for small reforms, as [10] is sat-
isfied for arbitrary values of  and . Hence, starting from any (,) pair, it
is always possible to increase the workers’ pay-off by decreasing marginally
; the process will stop when the gross income of the marginal entrepreneurs
reaches zero – see fn. 12. The local result therefore carries over as a global
result, which we state as:
Proposition 2. For any given t > 0, the optimal  is such that   ˜ ˜n ws − = 0,
i.e.   i e n
s. . ˜ = − 18.
Second, we already mentioned that all our findings concerning the desir-
ability of presumptive taxation are valid for any quasi-concave social welfare
function. When firms have all the same size, an even stronger result is availa-
ble. Noting that:
  d = d d d   
e˜ ˆ ˜ , ˜y sw n ns   − − ∀ > ;
substituting [9] and using [4] to simplify we get:
  
d = d   e
d d d =
˜ ˜ ˆ ˜ , ˜
( , )
y n cw n n
R
s s
 
 
0
∀ > ,
which is identical to [10]. Combining our previous observations, we can
therefore state the following:
Proposition 3. For any given t > 0, a revenue-neutral OC-PT reform is
Pareto-improving.
3. Presumptive taxation when firms differ in size
We now extend the model of the previous section by allowing the popu-
lation to be characterized by a pair of parameters: n, representing entrepre-
neurial ability, and s, representing firm size. We consider two levels of s,
namely s = l, h, l < h. The two s-groups are assumed to be of equal size (nor-
malized to unity), and within each s-group n is distributed uniformly over
18 Notice that, consistently with our derivation of proposition 1, t = 1 implies  = 0. Also,
with  optimised, it is easy to see that the optimal t is such that   ( ˆ)1 − a t  is maximized, which
gives the first order condition   1 0− −ˆ ˆa tat = . For instance, with c = 0.5a2 (hence   ˆa t= ), the
optimal taxes are t = .5 and    = −. ˜5ns .
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the continuous interval [0,1]. In this case, there are actually three tax bases
that the government can use: income and occupational choice as before, plus
labour costs, sw (recall that both s and w are observed by the government).
We restrict this more sophisticated form of presumptive taxation to be pro-
portional (input costs are taxed at rate ) and we label it Input Costs Pre-
sumptive Taxation (IC-PT) 19.
It is possible to show that occupational choice presumptive taxation
(OC-PT) is desirable also in this enlarged setting; a generalized version of
Proposition 1 holds also when firms differ in size (intuitively, the same ra-
tionale continues to be valid, because tax avoidance is still present). Howev-
er, since the joint consideration of OC-PT and IC-PT excessively compli-
cates the derivation of the results, we solve the model with IC-PT only, leav-
ing the comparison between the two types of presumptive taxes to the nu-
merical simulation in section 3.3. We start by describing the market equilib-
rium in the enlarged setting.
3.1. Market equilibrium
Occupational choices are now defined by the following pair of arbitrage
equations, one for each s-group:
[11]   y sw s n w w y
s se, w+ = +≡ − − ≡    ˆ ( ) s = l, h,
where ns is the marginal skill within group s.
The market clearing equation is written:
[12] nh + nl = (1 – nh)h + (1 – nl)l,
where the l.h.s. represents aggregate labour supply and the r.h.s. aggregate
labour demand.
Eqs. [11] and [12] determine the equilibrium wage rate,   ˜w , and the
equilibrium values of the marginal skills,   ˜ns , s = l, h, as a function of the
policy variables t and  (they are independent of ) 20:
19 Presumptive taxes based on input costs are mainly used in developed countries, e.g.
France, Israel and Italy, but there are also examples of this kind in Eastern Europe. For instance,
in Azerbaijan individual entrepreneurs are taxed on the basis of a given percentage of the mini-
mum wage of average workers. In other countries, simple presumptive taxes based on inputs are
often used (typically relying on quantities instead of monetary values): for instance, in Poland
taxation is related to the number of employees, and not to the wage bill (Harrison, 1997).
20 We assume interior solutions, i.e.   ˜ ( , )nl ∈ 0 1  and   ˜ ( , )nh ∈ 0 1 .
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[13]   ˜ ˆ ( )w lh l h= +
−1 ,
[14]   ˜ [( ˆ ) ]( )n h l l h
l = + + +−1    ,
[15]   ˜ [( ˆ ) ]( )n l h l h
h = + + +−1    ,
where    = + + + + + +lh l h lh l h( )( ˆ ) ( )2 2   . The presumptive tax rate, , af-
fects equilibrium variables as follows:
[16]   ˜ ( ) ˜w lh l h w = + +− <
− 1 2 0 ,
[17]   ˜ ( ˆ ) ( )( ) ˜n h l h w
l
  = +− − <− 1 1 0 ,
[18]   ˜ ( ˆ ) ( )( ) ˜n h l h w
h
  = +− − >− 1 1 0.
Since  taxes entrepreneurs, its increase will result in a lower wage be-
cause, were   ˜w  to stay fixed, some entrepreneurs (the least skilled among
them) would try to shift to a salaried job, causing thus an excess of labour
supply. An increase in  increases the number of entrepreneurs in the l-
group, while it reduces their number in the h-group (the effects are symmet-
ric due to the assumption of Leontief technology) 21.
The market equilibrium can be illustrated with the help of figure 1. The
left-graph shows the agents’ net incomes as a function of skill level (n) and
firm size (s). More type-h than type-l individuals become entrepreneurs
(  ˜ ˜n nh l< ) and conversely more type-l than type-h individuals are workers, as
type-h individuals, for any given n, are more productive than type-l individu-
als. In the right-graph, we then see that type-l entrepreneurs have (observa-
ble) input costs of   lw˜ , and (unobservable) income ranging from    + w˜  to
    − −lw l w˜ ˆ ( ˜ )+ 1 , while type-h entrepreneurs input costs are   hw˜  with in-
come ranging from    + w˜  to     − −hw h w˜ ˆ ( ˜ )+ 1 ; workers are bunched at
the bottom of the income distribution. Note that entrepreneurial income and
input costs are positively correlated, which suggests that the latter are a good
presumptive tax base. Since IC-PT would hit the entrepreneurs and not the
workers, we could then expect it to be useful to do some redistribution in
favour of the latter, e.g. by raising some revenue to fund an increase in the
lump-sum subsidy, ; moreover, since type-h entrepreneurs are, on average,
21 Different assumptions about technology (e.g. decreasing returns of labour inputs or
substitutability between labour and entrepreneurial effort) may lead to less clear-cut compara-
tive statics results.
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FIG. 1. Income distribution and input costs.
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richer than type-l, and have larger labour costs, we might also expect that
IC-PT fosters some redistribution between the two groups of entrepre-
neurs 22. We shall see however that things are somewhat more complicated
than it may appear on the surface.
3.2. Input Costs Presumptive Taxation (IC-PT)
To investigate the usefulness of presumptive taxation as a redistributive
device, we will focus, as in section 2.2, on small revenue-neutral reforms, in
which the government has a Rawlsian objective. Let us then consider the
possibility of finding a small reform (d, d) such that the budget is unaf-
fected but the workers’ net income goes up.
From   ˜y w
w = +  , and since   ˜w = 0 , a Rawlsian-improving reform is
characterized as follows:
[19]   d = d + d
w˜ ˜y w   > 0.
The resource constraint is written as:
[20]   R s≡ ∑
  
sn n y n y n cs n w n Rs
nn
n
n ss
s
s
d d d d =w e
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
− − − −
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟∫∫∫∫ ˜ ˜ ˆ ( ˜ ), ˜˜
˜
˜
11
0
1
.
22 However, notice that IC-PT is horizontally inequitable, as there are some equal-in-
come type-l and type-h individuals that end up paying a different presumptive tax (because
they have different production costs).
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It is immediate to see that   ˜ ˜ ˜y y y
l h
  
w e, e,= = = 1; hence, R = –2. Using this
to differentiate [20], and applying the implicit function theorem, we obtain:
[21]
  
d
d
=
d =



R
R
0
1
2
.
Substituting [21] into [19], gives:
[22]
  
d = + dw
d d d =
˜ ( / ˜ )
( , )
y R w
R 
  
0
2 .
This shows that a Rawlsian-improving self-financing tax reform requires
d > (=<)0 whenever   R w > =< −( ) ˜2 . Since   ˜w < 0, to have presumptive
taxation (d > 0) R must be positive and large enough to outweigh the nega-
tive impact of  on the wage rate. If  is not effective in raising revenue (e.g.
R positive but small) so that the factor multiplying d in [22] is negative,
then it is better to use a presumptive subsidy (d < 0). Therefore, the formal
analysis does not confirm the intuition suggested by our inspection of figure
1, as there are circumstances in which it may be preferable to subsidize the
entrepreneurs, rather than taxing them.
To have a better understanding of what determines the direction of the
Rawlsian-improving reform, we need a closer look at the partial derivative
R. By differentiating [20] with respect to  we get:
[23]   R R R R= + +  
1 2 3,
where
  R sn n
s
s
s
 
1 = −∑ ˜ ˜ ,
  R cs n w n n csw
s
s
s s
  
2 1= +[ ˆ ( ˜ ˜ )˜ ( ˜ ) ˆ ˜ ]−∑ − ,
  R s
3 = −∑
  
˜ ˜ ,
˜
˜
y n y ns
n
n
s
s
 
w e
 
 
 
 
d + d
1
0 ∫∫
⎛
⎝
⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟ .
While the reader is referred to the Appendix for the details of deriva-
tion, we will indicate here the sign of the three terms in which [23] has been
decomposed, and describe intuitively their interpretation.
The first term,   R
1 , represents the impact of  on aggregate output and
can be proven to be negative at  = 0, t > 0; that is, d > 0 reduces aggregate
output and consequently tax revenue. To see why, notice first that the lais-
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sez-faire market equilibrium turns out to be Pareto-efficient in the sense that
output is maximized. Indeed, one can use the arbitrage equations [11] to
show that, in the absence of government intervention, the following condi-
tion holds:
[24]
  
h n
h
l n
l
h l 
+
=
 
+
˜ ˜
1 1
.
This says that marginal l-entrepreneurs are as productive as marginal h-
entrepreneurs, since their output/input ratios are the same; intuitively, this is
the condition which ensures that total output is maximized. Since h/
(1 + h) > l/(1 + l), [24] can be satisfied only if   ˜ ˜n nh l< . This latter inequality
holds true also when proportional income taxation with tax avoidance is
present (cfr. figure 1), but equality [24] is not satisfied, because   ˜nl  is too
small and   ˜nh  is too large; when taxes can be avoided by the self-employed
only, too many low-productivity (and too few high-productivity) individuals
will choose to become entrepreneurs 23. As a result, marginal h-entrepreneurs
will be more productive than marginal l-entrepreneurs. Now, adding a pre-
sumptive tax on input costs (d > 0) would only make matters worse, as far
as production efficiency is concerned, since this would bring   ˜nl  further
down and would push   ˜nh  up in view of [17] and [18], thereby widening the
productivity differential.
The second term,   R
2, represents the impact of  on total tax avoidance
costs. Since by construction these are given by a fraction   ˆc  of the difference
between aggregate output and labour costs, the fact that a marginal increase
in  causes a reduction of output works in favour of reducing avoidance
costs as well; however, this effect is clearly dominated by the efficiency loss
associated with the reduction of output (because   ˆc < 1). On the other hand,
since   ˜w < 0 by [16], the effect of increasing  will be that of increasing
avoidance costs, because of the reduction of labour costs. The ensuing waste
of resources will determine a fall in revenue. Hence, we can be certain that
  R R 
1 2 0+ < .
So far, we have found that the overall impact of OC-PT on output and
avoidance costs calls for a presumptive subsidy on labour costs. The third
term,   R
3, however, can readdress the balance in favour of a presumptive tax.
This term represents the direct change in tax liabilities, since it accounts for
changes in disposable incomes; it is positive, since an increase in  reduces
23 Note that this is a specific effect of tax avoidance; there being no labour/leisure
choice, a proportional income tax without avoidance would not cause production inefficiency.
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agents’ aggregate net income and hence raises tax revenue. If this last term is
large enough to outweigh the first two, then a presumptive tax might be de-
sirable; otherwise, the government should use a presumptive subsidy.
3.3. A numerical simulation
To gain more insights on the conditions which determine the Rawlsian-
improving direction of reform, it may be helpful to employ a numerical anal-
ysis. We use the numerical simulation also to make a comparison between
OC-PT and IC-PT both in the presence and in the absence of income taxa-
tion (IT). We assume a quadratic cost of avoidance function, c = 0.5a2.
Hence,   ˆa t=  and   ˆ .c t= 0 5 2. Table 1 presents the results. In all cases, we set
l = 2, h = 4 (the main qualitative results are independent of the l and h val-
ues), and R = 0 (pure redistributive policy). As for notation,   ˜ ( )
,y se 1  denotes
the income of the entrepreneurs who are at the top of the income distribu-
tion in each s-group (those with n = 1) and 
  
Y l n n h n n
n nl h
=   d +   d
 
 
 
 
˜ ˜
1 1
∫ ∫  de-
notes aggregate output.
Table 1 is divided into four panels. In panel I there is no income taxa-
tion (t = 0) and only presumptive taxes are employed; the second column
contains the optimal IC-PT policy, in which  is set so as to maximize   ˜y
w;
the third column shows the optimal OC-PT tax rate () and, finally, the
fourth column contains the optimal combination of IC-PT and OC-PT. In
all cases,  is the residual tax instrument that balances the government’s
budget. Since t = 0, the first column in panel I shows market equilibrium in
laissez-faire (LF). The remaining panels (II, III and IV) present: income taxa-
tion (IT) in the first column, IT plus IC-PT in the second, IT plus OC-PT in
the third, and IT plus IC-PT plus OC-PT in the fourth. While in panels II
and III presumptive tax rates are optimised for a given value of t (0.2 and
0.4, respectively), in panel IV t is optimised too.
The results of the numerical analysis can be summarized as follows:
1. When t is relatively small (0 and 0.2),  is positive; for higher values of
t,  is negative (column two in each panel). Hence, a presumptive tax (subsi-
dy) should be used when income taxation is low (high) 24. This is consistent
with our intuition: when the income tax rate is very low, redistribution is lim-
ited, and therefore setting  > 0 allows a relevant equity gain, large enough to
24 For t ≥ 0.4, the constraint   ˜ ˜n wh − ≥ 0 is binding, and hence there is a corner solution
for .
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TAB. 1. Rawlsian-Optimal Tax Structures
I (t = 0) II (t = 0.2)
IT IT IT IT
LF IC-PT OC-PT IC-PT IC-PT OC-PT IC-PT
OC-PT OC-PT
 2.6875 0.2121 0.3009 –0.0579
t 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000 0.2000
 –0.5000 –0.3800 –0.4289 –0.4153
 0.3779 –0.1221 –0.0021 0.1233 0.2207 0.0214 –0.0054
  ˜yw 0.5581 0.5640 0.5640 0.5640 0.5726 0.5731 0.5784 0.5791
  ˜ ( ),y le 1 0.8837 1.0058 1.0058 1.0058 0.8422 0.8730 0.9484 0.9362
  ˜ ( ),y he 1 1.7674 1.6337 1.6337 1.6337 1.5611 1.5253 1.4465 1.4626
  w˜ 0.5581 0.1860 0.6860 0.5660 0.5616 0.4406 0.6963 0.7306
  ˜nl 0.8372 0.7791 0.7791 0.7791 0.8356 0.8172 0.7744 0.7822
  ˜nh 0.6977 0.7326 0.7326 0.7326 0.6986 0.7097 0.7354 0.7307
  ˜ ˜n wl − 0.2791 0.5930 0.0930 0.2131 0.2740 0.3766 0.0781 0.0516
  ˜ ˜n wh − 0.1395 0.5465 0.0465 0.1665 0.1370 0.2691 0.0391 0.0000
Y 1.3256 1.3198 1.3198 1.3198 1.3256 1.3249 1.3188 1.3204
III (t = 0.4) IV (t optimised)
IT IT IT IT IT IT IT IT
IC-PT OC-PT IC-PT IC-PT OC-PT IC-PT
OC-PT OC-PT
 –0.1500 –0.0429 –0.1189 –0.0350
t 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.4000 0.3387 0.5243 0.5000 0.4773
 –0.4500 –0.3140 –0.3750 –0.2811
 0.2296 0.1644 0.1350 0.1465 0.1985 0.2489 0.2109 0.2026
  ˜yw 0.5748 0.5800 0.5850 0.5862 0.5753 0.5815 0.5859 0.5867
  ˜ ( ),y le 1 0.8069 0.7901 0.9250 0.8869 0.8169 0.7842 0.8984 0.8728
  ˜ ( ),y he 1 1.3843 1.4159 1.2650 1.3133 1.4353 1.3194 1.2109 1.2620
  w˜ 0.5755 0.6927 0.7500 0.7327 0.5698 0.6991 0.7500 0.7348
  ˜nl 0.8293 0.8455 0.7500 0.7789 0.8319 0.8348 0.7500 0.7753
  ˜nh 0.7024 0.6927 0.7500 0.7327 0.7008 0.6991 0.7500 0.7348
  ˜ ˜n wl − 0.2539 0.1528 0.0000 0.0462 0.2621 0.1356 0.0000 0.0405
  ˜ ˜n wh − 0.1269 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1311 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Y 1.3255 1.3255 1.3125 1.3197 1.3255 1.3256 1.3125 1.3190
more than compensate the costs in term of production inefficiency and in-
creased avoidance costs; instead, when the income tax rate grows, having
 > 0 for redistributive purposes is not so important, while it may be useful to
have  < 0 in order to foster production and to reduce avoidance costs. Inter-
estingly, when all instruments are optimised in a Rawlsian sense, we have a
positive rate of income tax, and a negative tax on labour costs – see panel IV.
2. Presumptive taxes are all equivalent in the absence of income taxation
(panel I): OC-PT, IC-PT, or a combination of the two, bear a different im-
pact on the wage rate and on gross profits, but have the same impact on net
incomes and on real variables.
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3. OC-PT takes the form of a subsidy ( < 0) for all values of t (see col-
umn three in each panel) confirming that the result of proposition 1, ob-
tained in the case of identical s, carries over to the more general model with
two s-values.
4. OC-PT performs better than IC-PT in maximizing   ˜y
w , and is also
preferred by l-entrepreneurs. This is an interesting and striking result, which
says that simple presumptive taxes (such as licence fees) may be better than
complex ones (as those based on input costs). Indeed, OC-PT is equivalent
to IC-PT in the absence of income taxation, but performs strictly better in
its presence. The reason for this result is that IC-PT distorts aggregate pro-
duction more than OC-PT, since with the former   ˜nl  is larger and   ˜nh  is
smaller. As a further check, note that, comparing the fourth with the third
column of panels II to IV, we see that adding IC-PT to OC-PT results in
negligible improvements in workers’ welfare.
5. Finally, panel IV shows another interesting result: presumptive taxa-
tion allows for higher marginal progressivity of the income tax. In the nu-
merical example, the optimal marginal income tax rate is 33.8% in the ab-
sence of presumptive taxation, while it is above 47.7% when presumptive
taxes accompany the income tax.
4. Conclusions
It is often the case that certain groups of citizens can escape their tax ob-
ligations more easily than others. The presence of these «hard-to-tax «groups
may severely limit the redistributive action of the governments. One of the
possible responses to that is for the governments to engage in some form of
presumptive taxation. In this paper, we have argued that presumptive taxa-
tion may indeed be a useful instrument for raising the welfare of the less
well-off, although it may achieve this outcome in a somewhat unexpected
fashion. Indeed, we saw that there are circumstances in which the entrepre-
neurs, who are at the top of the income distribution and can avoid the in-
come tax, have to be subsidised in order to achieve an improvement of the
workers’ welfare. The reason why this occurs is that presumptive taxes have
not only a redistributive action, but also affect production efficiency as well
as the amount of resources devoted to tax avoidance. Our occupational
choice model can indeed capture the general equilibrium effects of taxation,
and we are therefore able to show that some forms of presumptive subsidies
can have positive effects on output and reduce tax avoidance costs, thereby
allowing an improvement in social welfare. Several authors, including Ka-
plow (1996), have emphasized that the interaction between market forces
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25 Watson (1985), Kesselman (1989), Jung, Snow and Trandel (1994) and Trandel and
Snow (1999) examine under different perspectives the interaction between labour market, in-
come taxation, tax dodging and the size of the underground economy.
and taxation is crucial for understanding the effect of the latter in the pres-
ence of tax avoidance 25. Ours is basically an attempt at taking a step in that
direction, and we hope therefore that the present paper has some value as a
methodological contribution as well as for its specific results.
Appendix
In this appendix, we derive the signs of the three terms in which [23]
has been decomposed. It turns out to be easier to work with a somewhat dif-
ferent expression for R. Rearranging the terms in [20], one has:
  R s≡ ∑
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Clearly, the derivative of the term in brackets with respect to  equals
  R R 
1 2+ . Using [17] and [18], then [13], [14], [15] and [12], we get:
  
R R
c lh h l n
h
n n cw
l
l h
 


  1 2
2 21
1
+ =
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+ +
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− − −
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,
which is negative at  = 0, t > 0, since   ˜n
l
 < 0 ,   ˆ >  and   ˜w < 0.
To derive   R
3, we first need to compute, using [16], the following partial
derivatives:
  ˜ ˜ ( ) ˜y w lh l h w  
w = = + +− <− 1 2 0,
  ˜ ( ˆ ) ˜ ˜ ( ) ˜y lw lw l lh l h w
l
   e, = + = + +− − − <− 1 2 0,
  ˜ ( ˆ ) ˜ ˜ ( ) ˜y hw hw h lh l h w
h
   e, = + = + +− − − <− 1 2 0 .
Substituting these into   R
3 and rearranging, we finally obtain:
  R n n lh l h lh l h w
l h
 3 1 2 2= + + + + + +− ( ˜ ˜ )[ ( ) ( )] ˜ ,
which is positive for all t < 1.
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Summary: In several Western countries, as well as in virtually all developing and transi-
tion ones, the government’s ability to redistribute income in favour of the less well-off is se-
verely limited by the fact that certain groups of citizens can escape their tax obligations more
easily than others. In this paper, we focus our attention on one of the possible responses to
that problem, namely the recourse to presumptive taxation, whereby not income as such, but
a proxy for income, is selected as the tax base. To study this issue, we employ an occupation-
al choice model where an individual can either be a worker or an entrepreneur. We assume
that a conventional income tax is in place and that only entrepreneurs, who are at the top of
the income distribution, can partially avoid the income tax. In this setting, we show that pre-
sumptive taxation based either on occupational choice or on the firms’ input costs can raise
the welfare of the workers, who are the poorest members of the society. This outcome is not
necessarily achieved, however, by taxing entrepreneurs: in a number of circumstances, pre-
sumptive subsidies for the entrepreneurs are preferable to presumptive taxes, the reason being
that the latter may cause production inefficiency as well as increase tax avoidance costs.
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